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Abstract 
We explore the idea of public policy from the perspective of evolutionary thinking. This 
involves paying attention to concepts like diversity, population, selection, innovation, 
coevolution, group selection, path-dependence and lock-in. We critically discuss the notion of 
evolutionary progress. The relevance of evolutionary dynamics is illustrated for policy and 
political change, technical change, sustainability transitions and regulation of consumer 
behaviour. A lack of attention for the development of evolutionary policy criteria and goals is 
identified and alternative choices are critically evaluated. Finally, evolutionary policy advice is 
compared with policy advice coming from neoclassical economics, public choice theory and 
theories of resilience and adaptive management. We argue that evolutionary thinking offers a 
distinct and useful perspective on public policy design and change. 
 
 
Keywords: Adaptive management, coevolution, escaping lock-in, evolutionary politics, 
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1. Introduction 
Advice on public policy is dominated by rational choice theories. This is clearly illustrated for 
the cases of environmental and climate policy making, which are predominantly informed by 
studies applying neoclassical-economic models and insights (e.g., Baumol and Oates, 1988; 
Peters et al., 1999; Sterner, 2003). Evolutionary thinking, a new set of theories and models that 
differs from rational choice theories in a number of ways, can offer refreshing insights about 
public policy making. It emphasizes populations of heterogeneous agents, bounded rationality 
and learning, innovation, path-dependency and multiple equilibria, thus offering a vocabulary 
suitable to engage with topical issues like responding to the financial crisis, adapting to climate 
change, and stimulating energy system transitions. Although the term “evolution” appears 
regularly in titles of articles in journals on innovation research, the large majority of them mean 
to denote simply change over time, development or a historical time pattern. Evolutionary 
economics has generated many studies and insights in the last decades that apply more 
consistently evolutionary dynamics to social systems. Even so, it lacks a firm, coherent 
perspective on policy in a broad sense. A recent article gives attention to evolution and 
innovation policy (Nill and Kemp, 2009), but similarly does not offer a comprehensive 
perspective on evolutionary policy. The current paper has the dual aim of collecting core 
insights from evolutionary policy thinking to arrive at a more complete view on evolutionary 
policy, and of demonstrating its relevance to policy-making and policy change. 
 The distinctive approach of evolutionary thinking can be characterized in various ways, 
namely as the interaction of innovation and selection, as changing populations of heterogeneous 
agents, as the impact of social-economic distribution on social-technical dynamics, and as 
economic agents adapting through innovation and imitation to changing external conditions. 
Evolutionary processes are characterized by five features: (i) a population with internal diversity 
of strategies or technologies, (ii) agents showing bounded rationality, (iii) selection, (iv) some 
form of inheritance or retention; and (v) innovation.  
As we will see later, evolution can be invoked in different ways to clarify policy. First, 
economic (non-genetic) evolutionary mechanisms, covering market, technological, institutional 
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and organizational aspects, are relevant to virtually all themes within public policy where 
heterogeneity and dynamics go hand in hand. This is the main motivation for the neo-
Schumpeterian approach to evolutionary economics (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Dosi et al., 
1989). In addition, there is a considerable literature on human sociobiology and evolutionary 
psychology which emphasizes human behaviour as genetically evolved in our distant past, 
implying certain features and biases which policy makers might want to take into account 
(Penn, 2003; van den Bergh and Stagl, 2003; Manner and Gowdy, 2009). This includes 
applications of evolutionary game theory which try to address questions regarding social aspects 
of human behaviour, including altruism and cooperation (Axelrod, 1986; Binmore, 2005; 
Nowak, 2006). Finally, in the realm of environmental policy analysis biological evolution might 
be relevant. For example, Munro (1997) studies net present value maximisation of agricultural 
crop cultivation when pesticide use causes selective pressure on the genetic composition of a 
pest population. Noailly (2008) extends his model by adding a population of agents with 
heterogeneous strategies, leading to biological-economic coevolution.   
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 elaborates the distinctive 
attributes of evolutionary socio-economic dynamics to arrive at a precise conceptualization of 
evolution, which is distinctive from more loose uses of the notion as mentioned above. Section 
3 discusses the complex relationship between evolution and progress. This is a necessary 
prelude to the applications that follow, since misunderstandings of the relationship between 
evolution and progress have long hampered the use of evolution in social sciences and public 
policy. Section 4 examines how evolution sheds light on the dynamics of policy change and 
related politics, i.e. it deals with change at the level of institutions. This allows for an 
understanding of the opportunities for, and barriers to, designing public policies. Section 5 
moves to a lower level and illustrates the implications of evolutionary thinking for policy design 
in three broad areas, namely technological change, sustainability transitions, and regulation of 
consumer behaviour. Section 6 addresses the problem that evolutionary analysts often avoid to 
make explicit, well-motivated choices concerning the normative foundations of their analyses. 
In turn it discusses critically alternative entry points for developing evolutionary policy criteria 
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and goals. Section 7 compares evolutionary theory with three other, influential approaches to 
policy analysis, namely neoclassical economics, public choice theory and resilience or adaptive 
management. Section 8 concludes. 
2. Evolutionary dynamics  
Evolution refers to any process of system change that involves the selective retention of 
renewable diversity (Campbell, 1969). Diversity, its renewal (i.e. innovation), its selection and 
retention are the building blocks of evolutionary explanations of cumulative complexity and 
improved adaptation of systems to their environment (Nelson, 1995).  
 Evolution, either genetic or non-genetic involves a number of complementary core 
elements and processes. The most central assumption is a population of agents, strategies, 
products, technologies, organization or institutions, which interact and are subject to the same 
selection environment. The members or elements of the population are characterized by 
diversity, which Stirling (2007) has decomposed into variety, balance and disparity. Here, 
variety denotes the number of different elements in the population, balance relates to the 
(frequency) distribution of the distinct elements, and disparity (or dissimilarity) captures the 
degree of difference or distance between elements in a population. Diversity is changed by 
selection and innovation processes. The first includes all processes that reduce existing 
diversity, while the second is the total of processes that generate new diversity.  
The selection environment generally involves physical, physiological and geographical 
constraints, and in economic systems also technological, organizational, market, institutional 
and regulatory factors. Selection should not be simplified as ‘survival of the fittest’, but rather 
as the survival of the sufficiently adapted unit in a changing selection environment.  
Knowledge and systematic search are crucial for innovation. Evolutionary theory makes 
a distinction between mutations and cross-over or recombination as sources of innovation. Our 
feeling is that in the social realm innovations always result from some combination of existing 
ideas or technologies. Innovation is gradual or radical, and often if not always caused by 
serendipity: combining insight, foresight and expertise with chance (Fine and Deegan, 1996). 
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Systematic search (R&D, science) is a method to increase the chance of useful innovative 
combinations. 
Next, for the previous factors not to result in erratic, unsustainable outcomes, 
inheritance (retention, transmission) is needed, which represents replication processes involving 
reproduction (dominant way in biological systems) or copying/imitation (important, though not 
only mechanism, in social systems). Selection, innovation and inheritance together cause 
evolution to be associated with a degree of durability and cumulativeness.  
Evolution typically is not associated with rational agents (members of the population) 
but consistent with bounded rationality (Nelson and Winter, 1982): individuals and 
organizations (groups) have imperfect information, learn, behave according to adapted or 
selected habits and routines, imitate others, and are myopic (in time and space), that is, search 
locally for improvements. In this sense, evolutionary thinking is perfectly compatible with 
recent developments in behavioral economics and psychology (Kahneman and Tversky, 2000; 
Camerer et al., 2004), adding to those a dimension of population and diversity dynamics.  
This basic evolutionary system gives rise to an interaction between an equilibrium 
force, namely selection, and a disequilibrating force, namely innovation. A non-equilibrium 
dynamic path of change generally results, due to the nonlinear nature of the complex 
evolutionary system, multiple attractors, indicating that the system is attracted to equilibria but 
usually out of equilibrium. Repeated selection typically reduces diversity, causing the 
population and individuals in it to become better adapted to the selection environment, and their 
fitness in terms of reproductive potential increases. If repeated selection goes along with 
increasing returns to scale – e.g., economies of scale in production, learning-by-doing, demand 
side network effects, and information externalities – then the system is path-dependent, which 
may mean lost capacity to adapt (a historical constraint). An evolutionary interpretation of this 
is that a system has so much diversity that it is highly unlikely that it will revisit a previous 
state, implying extreme sensitivity to initial events and a possibility of the system ending up in a 
lock-in of an arbitrary, not necessarily socially optimal technology or institution (Arthur, 1989). 
In brief, it means the system is characterized by history. This entails an essential difference with 
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other, more mechanistic theories of dynamic systems, which at best refer to simpler notions of 
irreversibility. 
The foregoing description represents the core model of evolution. It should be 
immediately noted that both genetic and non-genetic evolution are immensely more complex. 
Four important factors and mechanisms need to be mentioned, as they will turn out to be 
essential for a good understanding of technical and social-economic evolution. First, 
coevolution means that evolution involves multiple populations each evolving, but in 
interaction. In particular, part of the selection environment is made up of other biological 
population, causing the selection force to be variable and even endogenous if there is mutual 
selection feedback. This can lead to fast evolution as well as extreme features (red queen effect, 
arms race) (Ridley, 1995). Another interpretation of this is that coevolution means system 
dynamics involving codynamics between subsystems and evolutionary population dynamics 
(within subsystems). In other words, coevolution is fundamentally different from traditional 
codynamics of mechanistic subsystems that lack internal (dynamic) diversity (van den Bergh 
and Stagl, 2003; Winder et al., 2005). The concept of “niche construction” is related to 
coevolution. It conveys that populations of agents actively transform their environments, 
intentionally or accidentally, and in the process change theirs and other agents’ selection 
environment (Laland et al., 1999). This makes evolution more complex and less predictable, as 
has been illustrated in mathematical models (Noailly, 2008).  
Second, the notion of (spatial or ecological) isolation is very important in biology to 
explain speciation, i.e. a kind of radical innovation at a high scale. Similarly, in a social-
economic setting geographical and institutional isolation may be useful for fostering radical 
innovations as it creates technological or institutional niches that are protected against the 
dominant regime.  
Third, the notion of modular innovation is an important explanation of the dynamics, 
speed and complexity of evolution and evolutionary systems. It denotes that pre-adapted or pre-
selected complex units are combined resulting in ever more complex units. This can involve a 
combination of previously separated functions (mobile phone combining camera, internet, 
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music, etc) or the generation of an entirely new function (windmill=watermill technology + 
sail). Modular evolution has been shown to be an important force or search mechanism of both 
biological (Maynard Smith and Szathmáry, 1995) and technological (Mokyr, 1990) evolution, 
since it is the most important source of radical innovations, as illustrated by evolutionary 
computation (Watson, 2006). The latter is consistent with Potts (2000) view that economic and 
technological systems are complex “hyperstructures”, i.e. nested sets of connections among 
components. Economic change and growth of knowledge are in essence a process of changes in 
connections. New technologies, products, firms, sectors, and spatial structures arise that are 
more roundabout and complex than the old ones. Firm and economic growth are a process of 
creation of more complex organization, or new connections, as well as the grouping of those 
connections. The emergence of more complexity in both biological and human-economic 
systems has gone along with increased specialization of individuals, units or components, more 
cooperation and more complexity in communication/interaction between components of 
systems (at any level).  
Finally, the notion of group selection may be important to a complete evolutionary 
mapping of social-economic systems. It means that evolution not only operates at the level of 
individuals but also involves interactions within and among groups – group formation, splitting, 
competition, conflict, take-over, merger, group norms and cultures. This results then in 
multilevel, namely group plus individual, selection. These two selection processes can point in 
the same (reinforcement) or opposite direction (countervailing forces). The latter has been well 
illustrated for the analysis of altruism and cooperation (Traulsen and Nowak, 2006). Genetic 
group selection has been debated for a long time, but is receiving more support now (Wilson 
and Wilson, 2007), cultural group selection has been less controversial (van den Bergh and 
Gowdy, 2009). The reason is that group selection matches well the mounting evidence for 
humans possessing a large capacity for other-regarding behaviour, sophisticated 
communication, cultural transmission and social organization (Henrich, 2004). Group selection 
can be seen to open the old sociobiology debate in various directions, namely multilevel and 
dual inheritance (genetic and cultural; Boyd and Richerson, 1985). Morover, group selection 
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presents unique and refreshing opportunities to address issues of power and vested interests 
(Safarzynska and van den Bergh, 2009). 
Table 1 summarizes the identified elements or components of evolutionary thinking and 
also lists a number of important general consequences for each element. This should make clear 
that evolution is far from a simple framework, and one that is well capable of explaining 
complexity and change in reality. Arguably, there is no serious competitive framework for 
addressing dynamic complexity in biological and social systems. This makes evolutionary 
thinking an exciting and relevant approach to address pressing policy problems at a global scale 
since here both biological and social complexity reach their pinnacle. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
Finally, it is perhaps good to say that we are not claiming a biological evolutionary analogy for 
the social sciences, but rather arguing for a generalized evolutionary approach, as formalized in 
evolutionary computation and modelling (Eiben and Smith, 2003; Nowak, 2006). A similar 
perspective emanates from a recent proposal for a “generalized or universal Darwinism” in 
economics (Hodgson and Knudsen, 2006).2 In fact, it is well recognized that biological and 
economic evolution have a number of important differences (see Hodgson, 1993; van den Bergh 
and Gowdy, 2000). For instance, the genotype-phenotype distinction is not so sharp in social 
contexts. Where transmission of (genetic) information occurs mainly vertically (parent-
offspring) in biological systems, horizon (peers) and oblique (teacher-pupil) transmission is 
common in social settings. Social-economic evolution generally occurs at a faster pace than 
biological evolution. Extinction or selection is never so absolute in economics, as ideas can be 
easily preserved. While gene flow (or transfer of related adaptations) is virtually impossible 
between biological species, in social-cultural contexts information and ideas can easily be 
                                                 
2 This algorithmic view is not necessarily inconsistent with a historical view (the “Continuity Thesis”) 
according to which economic evolution is based on conditions that are themselves the outcomes of prior 
(biological and cultural) evolutionary processes. Nevertheless, a tension between this view and the 
generalized Darwinism perspective has been suggested (Cordes, 2006). 
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transferred from one sector or technology to another. Finally, the dynamics of social-economic 
systems is not only driven by evolutionary mechanisms but also by (imperfect) individual 
learning, foresight, and (imperfect) planning, at both individual and public levels. Finally, the 
distinction between genetic change and learning in biological systems is quite sharp, while this 
is not the case for social-economic systems. 
Evolutionary thinking has already been successfully integrated in a number of fields 
within the social and behavioral sciences. In economics, two approaches are evolutionary 
theories of technical change (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Dosi et al., 1988; Teubal, 1997; 
Metcalfe, 1998, Constant II, 2002) and evolutionary game theory (e.g., Friedman, 1998). 
Evolutionary economics is very much the legacy of Joseph Schumpeter, who first coined the 
notions of the innovative “entrepreneur” and “creative destruction”. The most influential and 
cited work since the 1950s has been that of Nelson and Winter (1982), who developed 
economic evolution around three building blocks, namely organization routines (a complex set 
of skilled individuals and interactions between them), search behavior and selection 
environment. Outside economics, the main progress on evolutionary thinking has probably been 
in anthropology (Boyd and Richerson, 2005) and evolutionary psychology (Buss, 2005).  
Evolutionary thinking has also been important in explaining how organizations change 
over time (McKelvey, 1982; Baum and Singh, 1994a; Aldrich, 1999). Selection acts upon entire 
organizations (e.g., Hannan and Freeman, 1989) or intra-organizational attributes, such as 
bundles of routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982), competency units (McKelvey, 1982) or 
managerial actions (Miner, 1994). Selection of intra-organizational attributes takes place both 
within the firm and between firms. Variations that are more helpful for the firm in acquiring 
resources or legitimacy propagate as more firms adapt them, or as the firms that have them 
grow. Selection forces include competitive market pressures, internal restructuring logics, 
power relations or conformity to institutionalized norms (Aldrich, 1999). Over time, the features 
of a population of organizations (e.g. form of organizations, style of management) tend to 
become isomorphic to the selection environment. But organizational populations also coevolve 
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with their selection environment, as they – intentionally or indirectly - transform it (Baum and 
Singh, 1994b; Lewin and Volberda, 1999).  
Finally, ideas from evolutionary economics have made headways to environmental 
studies (Norgaard, 1994; Gowdy, 1994; Rammel and van den Bergh, 2003; van den Bergh, 
1997). Norgaard  and Gowdy were the first to suggest that economy and ecosystems should be 
seen as two co-evolving systems. In a rare application of a formal model of coevolution, Noailly 
(2008) examines the interaction of a diversity of pesticide use strategies in a farmer population 
and diversity of resistance within the pest population, leading to biological-economic 
coevolution. Kallis (2009) represents change in urban water management as being the result of 
an interaction between an evolving population of households (with a variety of consumption 
practices) and an evolving policy system of competing ideas.  
 
3. Evolution and progress 
The use of evolution in public policy has been impeded by past misuse of the concept. Social 
Darwinists equalized progress with survival of the fittest in the social sphere, suggesting that the 
dominant gender, races, or nations are somehow evolutionary more advanced than subordinate 
ones. Evolution in some cases has been invoked also to justify a priori the status quo, in the 
sense that if ‘what is’ has somehow evolved, therefore it should not be changed. At its extreme, 
this might be taken as an argument against deliberative interference with social policy and 
institutions. But such uses confound a positive description of evolution with a normative 
statement that it is for the better. ‘What is’ does not equal ‘what ought to be’. 
 The relationship between evolution and progress merits some further consideration. In 
fact, it has received a great deal of attention in biology (see the articles in Nitecki, 1988). 
According to Maynard Smith and Szathmáry (1995, p4), “the notion of progress has a bad name 
among evolutionary biologists.” They suggest that the history of life is better depicted as a 
branching tree rather than progress on a linear scale.3 Many species have changed little over the 
                                                 
3 Nevertheless, certain authors, notably Conway Morris (2003) and Dawkins (1997), maintain that the 
broad strokes of evolution are almost inevitable, including the emergence of intelligent organisms such as 
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course of hundreds of millions of years. There are several reasons why both genetic and non-
genetic evolution do not necessarily give rise to progress: 
1. The most important reason is that selection is a local search process, which leads at best to a 
local optimum (not “survival of the fittest”, as first coined by Herbert Spencer, but survival 
of the fitter or relatively fit). 
2. Adaptations are often compromises between different objectives, being stimulated by a 
multitude of selection forces. This suggests that evolution is better regarded as multi-criteria 
evaluation than as single-objective optimization. 
3. Organisms or technologies are locked into historical constraints. In biology, this has been 
referred to as “bauplan limits” or “development constraint” (Gould and Lewontin, 1979) or 
phylogenetic inertia (Wilson, 1975, p20). In economics, it is treated under the headings of 
increasing returns to scale, path-dependence and lock-in (Arthur, 1989). In organization 
theory, it has been called “structural inertia” and “imprinting” (Hannan and Freeman, 1989, 
p70 and p205, respectively). 
4. Not all evolution is adaptive microevolution: randomness, genetic (molecular) drift, 
coincidental founder effects, etc. play an important role. In addition, macroevolution creates 
boundary conditions for adaptation and may destroy outcomes of microevolution, in a way 
as to set back time (‘initialize’). 
5. Selection can only ‘capture’ variations that exist. The process of creation of variation is 
limited and partly random. 
6. Agents explore only a minor range or subset of the opportunity space, which is reflected by 
the notion of bounded rationality. 
7. Coevolution and niche construction mean that the environment is not constant and 
exogenous to the individual species’ evolution, but influenced by it. Coevolution means 
adaptation to an adaptive environment. All straightforward notions of static or dynamic 
                                                                                                                                               
humans. This can be called ‘convergence’: “… what is possible has usually been arrived at multiple 
times, meaning that the emergence of the various biological properties is effectively inevitable.” (Conway 
Morris, 2003, preface). He adds the provision that, partly due to limited evolutionary time, the number of 
evolutionary end points (possible biological structures) is limited. 
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optimization are lost, since the boundary conditions in a constrained optimization 
formulation of evolution are not even known then. Coevolution also has historical, path-
dependent features. It can be cast in the adaptive landscape metaphor (Kauffman, 1993), in 
which case the landscape becomes something like a “… choppy sea rather than something 
forged in granite. In which case there would be no real progress, for as soon as one climbed 
a peak it would collapse beneath one.” (Ruse, 1999, p118). 
 
Sen (1993) further notes that evolution as improving species does not imply improving the 
welfare or quality-of-life of each individual. Fitness is not a useful criterion for progress in 
general, even though the evolution of a species into one that is more efficient in food gathering, 
moves faster (running, swimming, flying), or is more effective in performing certain functions, 
can usually be regarded in terms of fitness increase. The reason is simply that a higher fitness 
and survival do not necessarily imply a happier or more pleasant life. In fact, evolutionary 
models often show that inequality arises again and again in evolutionary systems, suggesting 
that structurally at least part of a population is relatively unhappy (e.g., Epstein and Axtell, 
1996). This itself has immediate policy implications, namely that one has to be aware of, and 
possibly continuously counter, tendencies of inequality arising in systems characterized by 
evolutionary forces. In general then, it is difficult to say under which conditions evolution leads 
to economic progress, also because the latter is not an evident phenomenon. In fact, there is a 
longstanding debate in the social sciences about suitable indicators of social welfare and 
progress, while it is accepted that all available indicators suffer from shortcomings (van den 
Bergh, 2009). 
 With regard to the theme of happiness and well-being, evolutionary thinking leads to a 
perspective that is similar to that of behavioural economics and social and psychology, where 
bounded rationality, social interactions, status seeking, and basic versus higher needs are 
emphasized. At the level of psychology, the distinction between basic and higher needs (the 
good old Maslow’s pyramid, also known as lexicographic preferences) is relevant. Once basic 
needs are satisfied, one is in the realm of the higher needs. With regard to the latter, individual 
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income and consumption cannot be seen separately from other individuals in a relevant social 
environment (‘peer group’). The notion of relative or context-dependent well-being has been 
proposed to address this (Tversky and Simonson, 2000). This notion is characterised by a 
comparison and rivalry with others. This explains the striving for “conspicuous consumption” 
(Veblen, 1899), “positional goods” (Hirsch, 1976) and “status goods” (Howarth and Brekke, 
2003). Evolutionary biology has shown that sexual selection has fixed status-seeking or 
extravagant, differentiating behaviour in our genes (psychologists call it an ‘automatic’ 
behaviour). However, conspicuous consumption and the quest for the acquisition of material 
and scarce social goods as a way to differentiate oneself and climb up the status hierarchy have 
become a very serious social problem. They relate to large-scale environmental impacts, as a 
result of unprecedented large numbers of consumers, high living standards and polluting 
production techniques. Recognizing that – at least part – of such social behaviours has an 
evolutionary origin is not equivalent to legitimating them (Jackson, 2005). First, selfish, status-
seeking or acquisition instincts coexist with, also evolutionary adapted, other-regarding, 
altruistic instincts and resultant social behaviours of sharing or voluntary restraint. Second, the 
social expression of instincts is not pre-determined: whereas rivalry consumption and status-
seeking differentiation behaviours do show up in different times and human cultures (Buss, 
1989), there is also a huge difference between patterns of material consumption, expressions of 
status and resultant social organizations across cultures and time. The implication is that there is 
scope: (i) for sophisticated policies that can mould the social environment in ways that will 
favour certain instincts while suppressing others, and (ii) for social arrangements that will 
encourage alternative, non-socially destructive, signifiers of difference and status (Jackson, 
2005). 
 Relative welfare and rivalry consumption are closely related to (endogenous) changes in 
preferences. Many of these are formed or at least influenced by media, steered by commercial, 
private (business) interests. The rivalry feelings are greatly misused for this purpose, in the 
direction of both adults and children. Income rises usually go along with new products and 
changes in preferences. No one, however, guarantees that the creation of new preferences 
13
 #0902 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
contributes to happier lives. Therefore, the rivalry has been negatively characterized as 
reflecting a “rat race” and “affluenza virus”. It resembles the “Red Queen hypothesis” in 
evolutionary theory: repeated selection for fitness so as not to be taken over by others 
(Strickberger, 1996, p511). The phenomenon of relative welfare and rivalry in consumption 
means that a rise in relative income can increase the well-being of a particular individual, while 
being neutral or negative for social welfare. The reason is simple: improvements in relative 
income and welfare come down to a zero-sum game – one person loses what another gains 
(Layard, 2005). 
Concluding, evolution has some elements of directionality and progress. Nevertheless, 
evolution certainly is not identical with continuous progress. Furthermore, much of what is 
presented as progress by cultural or technological optimists often possesses mixed blessings. 
 
4. Evolution, politics and policy change 
We start with the implications of evolution for the higher, institutional level of change. The 
simple question here is: how do policies change? Evolutionary theory offers important insights 
about the dynamic mechanisms underlying policy change. This involves drawing attention to 
bounded rationality of agents involved in the policy process (Witt, 2003), diversity of policy 
ideas and selection in a multi-dimensional environment (Kerr, 2002) and path-dependence of 
policies (Pierson, 2000a). Evolutionary theory introduces the key notions of time and sequence 
(Mahoney, 2000) and historicizes policy change in comparison to static, comparative 
equilibrium explanations (Pierson, 2000a). 
 Because of bounded rationality, political actors are heavily selective in their learning 
and the way they filter information. Perceptions and hence attention are affected by preferences 
in a recursive manner that binds together similar-minded political actors into social networks 
and communities with highly intensive internal communication but relatively insulated from 
external influence (Witt, 2003). Policy ideas (shared understandings of explanations of 
problems or specific solutions) and discourses (concepts and categorizations that give meaning 
to physical and social realities) are important vehicles for simplifying complex information and 
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constructing mental maps that bring together individual actors into communities (e.g. “discourse 
communities”, Hajer, 1995). Only a few policy problems can garner sufficient public and policy 
attention (Witt, 2003) This produces an uneven temporality of policy evolution as the early 
agenda-setting stage becomes critical for subsequent outcomes and heavily attended by political 
actors. Indeed, political scientists have invoked an analogy to the idea of “punctuated evolution” 
– controversial in biology – , which denotes periodic phases in policy change where the pace 
and extent of transformation is significantly accelerated (Hay, 1999; Baumgartner, 2006). 
Policy activity for some environmental problems exhibits an S-shaped curve of phases of 
intense activity followed by stability as indicated by public budget spending, media coverage or 
parliament activity (Baumgartner, 2006). The notion of “crisis” (Hay, 1999) is central in 
explaining these intense accelerated searches for policy solutions.  
 At the heart of theories of policy evolution is the notion that political and economic 
environments impose selective pressures upon alternative political strategies and that political 
actors, through processes of trial, error and learning, continuously adapt their strategies to this 
selection environment (Kerr, 2002; Ward, 2003). Of course, since this environment is changing 
and evolutionary as well, consisting of populations of producers and consumers and other 
stakeholders, the notion of coevolution may be relevant as well. At any given moment, there are 
competing ideas and solutions to policy problems, which replicate through imitation and survive 
through competition in political arenas (John, 1999; Kingdon, 1995). Political actors have multi-
dimensional motives and interests which assume meaning by being expressed in specific ideas. 
Actors struggle in the policy arenas to see their ideas chosen and implemented. The constraining 
selection environment is multi-dimensional (media, elections, public opinions, power), context-
specific and changing over time (John 1999; Kerr, 2002). Hay (1999) inspired by Kuhn, 
introduces the importance of “policy paradigms”, perceived as packages of affiliated ideas and 
responses (e.g. Keynesianism or free-market environmentalism), which act as higher-level 
filters that limit the range of legitimate understandings and responses to problems, and thus 
selectively constrain lower-level responses, channelling policy change into limited paths (see 
also Kerr, 2002).  
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 Increasing returns and path-dependence are prominent in political environments. 
Individual and organizations’ investments in specialized skills, relationships and political 
identities are influenced by existing political arrangements and in turn make them preferable to 
hypothetical alternatives (Pierson, 2000a). The high-start up and exit costs that characterize 
collective action and the development of institutions, as well the positive feedbacks involved in 
the social interpretation of information and the attraction of a critical mass of communicators 
also create path dependency (Pierson, 2000a, Witt, 2003). The employment of power is also 
self-reinforcing. Once an institution develops, it empowers certain groups at the expense of 
others, which in turn further change the institution to favour their interests (Mahoney, 2000). 
Path-dependence may be more pronounced in political than economic systems, despite the fact 
that markets are characterized by many increasing returns on demand and supply sides (see 
Section 2) (Pierson, 2000a). Understanding policy evolution as a path-dependent process shifts 
the emphasis in analysis to earlier, historical events, which by design or accident may have 
locked-in institutional development to a certain path. The sequence in which events happen 
becomes important, which is typical for path-dependence of course (Mahoney, 2000; Thelen, 
2000).  
Understanding the dynamics of the policy process has implications for (desirable) 
institutional interventions. For instance, the insights of public choice theory concerning the 
opportunistic behaviour of policy-makers and vested interests have been used to support 
institutional changes that limit state intervention in the economy or involve privatization of state 
competencies. In section 7, we will examine implications for policy design of evolutionary 
understandings of policymaking dynamics, by comparing evolutionary policy and public choice 
theories.  
 
5. Evolution and policy design in three selected areas 
The studies reviewed in this section operate at the conceptually lower level of policy design, and 
are typically oblivious of the higher level context discussed in the previous section. The 
understanding of policy as an evolutionary process complicates paradigmatic assumptions of 
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policy design studies, such as the presence of benign decision-makers and external analysts. We 
return to these complications in section 7. Here we review key insights from evolutionary 
economics in three areas of policy design: innovation and technology policy; transition policy; 
and sustainable consumption policy.  This is just illustrative. 
 
Innovation and technology policy from an evolutionary angle 
Evolutionary thinking has been most fruitfully applied in the study of technological innovation. 
In fact, there is not a very sharp dividing line between innovation studies and evolutionary 
economics. Many analyses of innovation make implicit use of evolutionary notions like 
selection, diversity and mutation, while a large part of neo-Schumpeterian, evolutionary 
economics deals with technological change (Dosi et al., 1988; Witt, 1993; Metcalfe, 1998). 
Studies in this vein address the analysis of processes at the company level (technological 
innovation), market and sector level (competition and diffusion, structural change) and macro 
level (growth, long waves and international trade). A minority of studies on technological 
innovation employ evolutionary concepts and theories in a strict manner. For example, the often 
applied notion of “innovation system” (Lundvall, 1988; Nelson, 1992) bears no specific relation 
to evolutionary concepts, even though one could combine the two. As noted in Section 1, even 
though the term “evolution” appears regularly in titles of articles in this journal, the large 
majority of them just mean to denote unspecified “change”, “development” or a “historical time 
pattern”. 
The evolutionary perspective stresses bounded rationality in the invention, innovation 
and diffusion phases, the evolution of technology through local interactions, innovation through 
recombination, and heterogeneity of innovators. Metcalfe (1994) argues that at the core of the 
evolutionary-economic approach to technological innovation is asymmetry of knowledge and 
information due to heterogeneity of firms (potential innovators). Nannen and van den Bergh 
(2009) translate this into policy recommendations like “prizes” and “advertisement” to stimulate 
the social network of interactions and useful imitation behaviour. Given lack of knowledge or 
uncertainty about the distribution and dynamics of this information, policy makers cannot 
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optimize technical change from a social welfare perspective. Instead, the two main strategies 
open to them are moulding the selection environment to direct selection processes rather than 
select themselves the optimal technology or technological path, and to create favourable 
conditions for innovation, using notions like innovation systems and niche management.  
Niche management is one evolutionary strategy to foster innovations which has 
attracted some attention (Kemp et al., 1998). It involves processes of social experimenting and 
learning, the creation and exploitation of technological niches, increasing variety by niche 
branching, and assuring stabilization through implementing rules and accepted practices. Policy 
can try to guide this process, by stimulating diversity, extending the network of actors and 
stakeholders involved, and by destabilizing the dominant socio-technical regime. Niche markets 
can be created, for example, through subsidies to consumers or producers. They can accelerate 
the learning curve and benefits of economy of scale. From an evolutionary perspective, 
stimulation of niches is a specific case of a general condition that stimulates major innovations, 
namely isolation. Regional or local (urban) experimentation, like allowing for decentralized 
energy/electricity provision, is a specific approach to niche management (van den Bergh et al., 
2006, 2007). 
Technological diversity increases through innovation. This is not a blind, random 
process, as humans act in intentional, forward-looking ways. The notion of serendipity is 
relevant here, as it reflects that discoveries or inventions result from a combination of chance, 
intelligence and knowledge/expertise (Fine and Deegan, 1996). Expertise, lateral thinking and 
multidisciplinary cooperation are important as innovation often (if not always) takes the route of 
recombinant or modular innovation, thriving on existing diversity. Choices regarding diversity 
usually remain implicit, and when made explicit, often involve a conflict between efficiency and 
diversity aims based on the idea that efficiency relates positively and diversity negatively to 
increasing returns to scale in markets. An optimal balance between increasing returns to scale 
(short term benefits of little diversity) and recombinant innovation (long term benefits of much 
diversity) is needed to arrive at knowledge about how much diversity is desirable (van den 
Bergh, 2008), taking into account the different components of diversity as discussed in Section 
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2, i.e. variety, balance and disparity. The government can stimulate a wide range of technologies 
in terms of variety, disparity and balance, the development of modular technologies which allow 
many innovative combinations, and information exchange to increase the likelihood of cross-
fertilisation and modular innovations. Policy might further stimulate radical innovations by 
raising the disparity between technological options, notably by directing public R&D at 
‘deviant’ technologies and by funding risky R&D. 
 Other typical evolutionary perspectives on technological and related economic change 
involve concepts like growth based on a growing population of firms each increasing in size or 
capital (Nelson and Winter, 1982), and path-dependence, which may result in a lock-in 
situation, due to changes in diversity and related positive feedback (Arthur, 1989). The policy 
relevance of the latter will be discussed next in more detail. 
 
Unlocking and policy for social-technical transitions to sustainability 
The problem of lock-in mentioned in Section 2 is an important reason for current discussions 
about transition policy with an eye to environmentally sustainability (Elzen et al., 2004). This 
has been conceptualized as a (co-)evolutionary processes operating at multiple levels (Geels, 
2002). From an evolutionary angle, the path-dependent trajectory to a state of lock-in involves 
systematic loss of diversity. Destabilizing the dominant regime and maintaining or enhancing 
diversity are key to escaping a state of lock-in. The environmentally most significant examples 
of lock-in are the dependence of electricity generation and modern transport systems on fossil 
fuels and fuel combustion engines. Relevant questions are how regime shifts occur, how they 
can be stimulated, and how a new lock-in of a socially undesired technology can be avoided. 
Un-locking generally cannot be realized by simply ‘correcting prices’ for environmental 
externalities, but requires dealing with increasing returns on demand and supply sides. This has 
been referred to as an extended level playing field where alternative technologies, organizations 
and institutions are able to compete with the dominant social-technological regime (van den 
Bergh et al., 2006, 2007). It requires a combination of environmental policies (externality 
regulating), innovation policy and unlocking shocks. Examples of the latter are setting a 
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stringent long run policy goal (such as ‘zero emissions’ in California) to meet the requirement 
of reducing policy uncertainty, stimulating pathway and complementary technologies (e.g., 
electric batteries, fuel cells), and stimulating diversity and adaptive flexibility to increase 
evolutionary potential (Rammel and van den Bergh, 2003). Unruh (2002, p.323) proposes “a 
countervailing critical mass or social consensus for policy action” through education of the 
general public. He suggests that providing information on extreme climate events (‘disasters’) 
may create critical support for strict climate policies and changes in current institutions.  
Stimulating unlocking requires in addition that all explicit and implicit stimuli of the 
dominant technology are removed (subsidies, knowledge, experience), and that preferential 
treatment (e.g., in public choices and purchases) be given to desirable alternatives. This is 
difficult, not only because humans are habitual and learn slowly, but also because of vested 
interests which are usually well-organized or powerful, and create create political resistance 
against necessary changes. In addition, both private and public agents tend to look for short-
term gains and cost-effectiveness, which frustrates promising technologies which are still low 
on the learning curve. Nill and Kemp (2009) mention time strategies as suitable for escaping a 
situation of lock-in. This means that innovation policy varies over time on the basis of 
diagnosed time-varying states, which may be characterized by little, very little or no diversity 
(Sartorius and Zundel, 2005). In addition, various authors focus on niche-creation as a strategy 
to foster a transition (Schot and Geels, 2007).  
 
Regulation of consumer behaviour 
Regulation of consumers is relevant for environmental, public health (e.g., contagious diseases, 
smoking, drinking) and safety (insurance, traffic) reasons. Traditional theories of regulation 
depend very much on representative agent models. Evolutionary approaches combine various 
aspects of bounded rationality with populations of interacting and heterogeneous agents. 
Bounded rationality involves social interactions like imitation, reputation and status seeking 
(relative income effects), and habitual behaviour, decisions under uncertainty and myopia. 
Evolutionary thought can help here in assessing effective as well as efficient policies, or even 
20
 #0902 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
suggest new instruments (next to standards, taxes and subsidies), such as prizes and specific 
tools of information provision (Nannen and van den Bergh, 2009). 
Penn (2003) argues that from an evolutionary angle individual incentives are the most 
effective way of environmental policy. This seems to be consistent with the main policy 
message of environmental economics (Baumol and Oates, 1988), but Penn adds the provision 
that these incentives go beyond narrow economic, monetary interests. They should, for instance, 
also take social interactions (e.g., reputation effects) into account. This is consistent with 
findings of economic psychology and experimental economics, as well as of group selection 
theory (Section 2). Group phenomena can be linked to a variety of social – non-selfish or other-
regarding – preferences: reciprocal fairness, inequity aversion, pure altruism, altruistic 
punishment and spite or envy (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002).  
Against this background, Hausfather (2006) considers the well-known Coase theorem 
(Coase, 1960), which states that, in the presence of pollution, a socially optimal outcome may 
result through bargaining between polluter and victim, regardless of initial property rights (in 
the absence of transaction costs). He argues that this result may fail to occur when fairness 
norms and legal property rights are incongruent, since then altruistic punishment is likely. 
Kahneman et al. (1990), relating psychological property rights (equivalent with fairness norms) 
to endowment effects, show that the latter can explain why the willingness to accept the loss of 
environmental goods and services will be considerably higher than the willingness to pay for 
them. They also conclude that Coasian bargains are less likely when fairness norms and legal 
property rights are inconsistent. In view of this, it is not surprising that persistent conflicts rather 
than swift bargains are a common response to environmental externality problems (Martinez-
Alier, 2005). 
 Consumers cannot be seen in isolation from producers, investors and innovators on the 
supply side of markets. In order to understand the impact of direct regulation of consumers, one 
may want to take into account evolutionary processes and heterogeneity on both sides of 
markets. There is a small literature of resulting models of coevolving consumers and producers. 
One policy-relevant insight is that status-seeking can be exploited by policy makers to stimulate 
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the emergence of product niches that can counter lock-in or dominant regimes. On the other 
hand, imitation behaviour tends to reinforce tendencies of lock-in. Different sub-groups 
showing different types of average social strategies, including poor versus rich with different 
peer groups for income or welfare comparison, may require specific policy strategies. In other 
words, the diversity of consumers translates into diversity of policies (Janssen and Jager, 2002; 
Windrum and Birchenhall, 2005; Safarzynska and van den Bergh, 2007). 
 Finally, as already discussed in section 3, evolutionary analysis allows for a better 
understanding of consumers as it emphasizes interactions between consumers in populations. In 
particular, the notions of relative income, conspicuous consumption, positional goods and 
rivalry for status as a zero-sum game are relevant here, and imply a very different perspective 
than traditional, mainstream views of consumers. This has obvious implications for welfare-
improving policy, including concrete suggestions like taxation of conspicuous consumption and 
regulation of commercial advertising. 
 
6. The search for normative foundations: policy criteria and goals from an evolutionary 
perspective  
In many of the evolutionary analyses reviewed in the previous section, there is an implicit 
normative assumption that the maintenance of evolution itself is a desirable state of affairs 
(Witt, 2003). For example, in evolutionary studies of technological change, technological 
diversity and innovativeness (generation of new variety) are appraised as desirable per se. This 
is hard to justify as evolutionary outcomes are not necessarily beneficial in any particular sense 
(Witt, 2003) and diversity or innovation may come at the expense of other social goals (Kallis, 
2007). Innovation moreover does not appear without cost, but requires expensive R&D of some 
sort, and the additional diversity may come at a cost in terms of lost increasing returns to scale 
associated with specialization (van den Bergh, 2008). 
 An alternative normative framing that some evolutionary works have opted for is 
constraining themselves to a positive analysis, which illuminates alternative possible future 
states (Verspagen, 2009). An agnostic position is maintained with respect to the criteria and 
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valuation schemes according to which these alternative states can be compared. CBA, multi-
criteria evaluation and deliberative assessments are all in principle applicable. This is also 
unsatisfactory, as one implicitly always adheres to a normative position if one performs an 
analysis to enlighten or inform policy. A theory of ethics or a social philosophy that can fit the 
type of evolutionary dynamics described here is missing and there is little research in this 
direction (Witt, 2003). Without making a choice for the moment, we can see a number of partly 
consistent entry points to resolve this issue and advance evolutionary policy analysis and 
assessment. 
 First, although evolutionary processes do not assume any goal or target, normative 
elements can be added by policy-makers. In this sense evolutionary policy analysis allows for 
the same distinction between positive and normative as neoclassical-economic policy theory: 
the normative goals can be the same (e.g., maximum social welfare or minimum cost of 
regulation), but they do not have to be. Even though one may adopt the same normative 
principle, the positive approaches evidently differ between evolutionary and neoclassical 
economics, namely evolutionary processes versus market equilibrium processes, respectively. 
As a result, the outcomes of the confrontation of normative goal and positive model may, and 
are likely to, differ between the two approaches (see Section 7 for more details). 
A second consideration is that evolution introduces the element of system complexity, 
uncertainty about the future, unpredictability and limited policy control. This could suggest two 
specific choices of policy goal_(1) a focus on effectiveness: better to inefficiently reach a target 
than efficiently miss it: or (2) a focus on risk-aversion: a precautionary principle, for example, 
operationalized via a “minmax regret” approach.  
A third relevant consideration is that a definition of evolutionary progress can provide 
more explicit normative guidance. As argued in Section 3, such progress is not inevitable nor 
always occurring in evolutionary systems. Nevertheless, one can still aim at using policies to 
bring about evolutionary progress. When choosing this route, a problem is that there are 
different interpretations or criteria of evolutionary progress in use (e.g., Gowdy 1994, Chapter 
8; Gould, 1988; Potts, 2000): increasing diversity and increasing complexity, extended division 
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of labour, new ways of transmitting information, population growth, adaptation to the 
environment (Dawkins, 1982), and increasing efficiency of energy capture and transformation 
(Schneider and Kay, 1994). Taking several of these into account and seeing (hoping) for a 
degree of consistency would be a way to go forward. When different indicators sketch different 
pictures one can add weights or make a clear choice. 
 A fourth consideration is more fundamental in nature. It starts from the insight that 
evolution involves the assumptions of bounded rationality of individual economic agents and 
changing preferences. This has implication for the notion of social welfare and consumer 
sovereignty. Most importantly perhaps, one can argue that the famous Arrow (1950) paradox, 
stating that aggregation of individual preferences into social preferences is impossible if both 
types of preferences are to satisfy a minimum set of reasonable conditions, looses relevancy 
under the behavioural-evolutionary view on reality. The reason is that preferences and norms 
(values) reflect bounded rationality and are themselves evolving (Witt, 2003; Norton et al., 
1998; Norgaard, 1994).4 Individuals and political actors learn about, and modify, preferences 
based on previous actions and experienced outcomes. As a result, there can be no fixed 
aggregation, even if the Arrow paradox were not true. More specifically, because of changing 
individual preferences there can certainly not be any constant intergenerational social welfare 
function. Intertemporal and intergenerational comparisons are also problematic since the policy 
actions taken on the basis of present comparisons will influence future preferences (Norgaard, 
1994; Witt, 2003). 
We do not aim to settle the difficult issue of evolutionary policy criteria here. Our 
stance is that the first consideration is attractive, but hampered by the fourth consideration. 
Nevertheless, a clear distinction between normative and positive is desirable. In addition, the 
normative goals could be multiple, including ones independent of evolution (such as presently 
much discussed measures of subjective well-being or happiness) as well as ones more closely 
                                                 
4 Ostrom (1990) has considered the endogenous character of norms in a common pool resource context 
using evolutionary thinking and later studies have employed formal evolutionary models to analyse self-
organizing solutions of common dilemmas, notably relating to renewable resource use (Sethi and 
Somanathan, 1996; Noailly, 2006). 
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related to evolutionary processes, such as suggested under the second and third considerations. 
The resulting three types of criteria could fulfil complementary roles.  
 
7. Evolutionary policy: differences with other approaches 
Here we compare policy from an evolutionary angle with important alternative views on policy, 
namely neoclassical-economic policy theory (based in rational choice theory), public choice 
theory, and theories of resilience and adaptive management. Neoclassical economics and public 
choice theory weigh heavily on public policy design in areas such as economic, health and 
environmental policy. Resilience theory bears affinity to evolutionary theory as it also offers a 
policy and management framework that attempts to deal with complexity and diversity in 
systems – whether environmental, socioeconomic or political. We argue that evolutionary 
thinking offers a distinctive, and in several aspects improved, perspective on public policy and 
change.    
 
Evolutionary- vs. neoclassical-economic views on policy 
The traditional economic theory of public policy is the result of applying neoclassical welfare 
theory, which comes down to connecting a competitive equilibrium and a social welfare 
optimum (or, less ambitiously, Pareto efficient situation). The positive part of this approach, i.e. 
the competitive equilibrium supported by representative or average, rational consumers and 
producers, is contested by evolutionary economics, which emphasizes a population of diverse 
agents, bounded rationality, and as a result persistent disequilibrium, multiple attractors and 
path-dependence. This in general means a much less optimistic view on policy. In addition, as 
discussed, the normative part of neoclassical economics may be contested from an evolutionary 
perspective. Disputing both the normative and positive basis of neoclassical economic policy 
analysis means that the correspondence between market equilibrium and a social welfare 
optimum is lost. In turn, the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics5 no longer hold. 
                                                 
5 The first theorem states that in the absence of market failures, any (Walrasian) competitive market 
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As a result, planning or market solutions cannot be guaranteed to realize socially optimal 
outcomes.  
The economic theory of environmental policy offers an approach to evaluate, compare and 
design of instruments of regulatory policy. This focuses attention on the efficiency (either 
welfare maximization or cost-minimization) such instruments (Baumol and Oates, 1988). It 
assumes rational producers and consumers, and markets in equilibrium and clearing. The 
approach neglects selection other than through market competition, innovation, changing 
diversity of technical options, irreversibility due to path-dependence, and diversity of policy 
experiments in regions and countries. Neoclassical-economic policy analysis addresses certain 
aspects of diversity, namely heterogeneity of abatement options and related costs of polluters, 
and shows that if firms are profit-maximizing or cost-minimizing total (national or sector) 
abatement costs will be minimized if regulation employs price-based instruments like taxes, 
charges or levies. The latter will make sure that marginal abatement costs will be equal among 
polluters, even though some polluters may pollute less, namely those with relatively expensive 
options, than others. This approach nevertheless assumes static heterogeneity and does not take 
dynamic diversity – typical of evolutionary processes – into account. Resource economics, 
dealing among others with renewable resources such as fisheries and forestry (Johansson and 
Löfgren, 1985; Clark, 1990), tends to search for optimal exploitation without taking into 
account evolutionary or selection effects of resource exploitation. Neither does mainstream 
resource economics give much attention to the evolution of norms, for example, through local 
interaction of resource users. Finally, economic growth theory does not take the heterogeneity 
of firms and technologies into account as is the case in evolutionary (differential) growth theory. 
In addition, it does not allow for much policy detail in terms of innovations, selection 
environment and lock-in. Whereas evolutionary economic approaches emphasize dynamics due 
to innovation and selection, neoclassical economics focuses on static equilibria or dynamic 
                                                                                                                                               
equilibrium gives rise to a socially optimal or (Pareto) efficient allocation of resources. According to the 
second theorem, any efficient allocation can be realized by a certain competitive equilibrium. In the case 
of market failures, government regulation needs to assure that market outcome and social optimum 
coincide (e.g., Varian, 1992). 
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equilibria characterized by representative or aggregate agents and dynamics due to 
accumulation (mainly of productive and human capital). 
Closely related to policy theory is cost-benefit analysis (CBA) which is used to evaluate 
public investment projects. This requires the application of monetary valuation techniques, both 
revealed and stated preference techniques, to assess non-market effects like environmental 
damages and health impacts in monetary terms (Johansson, 1987). Both environmental policy 
and monetary valuation theories depend essentially on assumptions like rational behaviour of 
agents and market equilibrium. Evolutionary insights, however, underpin that individuals are 
boundedly rational as well as other-regarding, which may explain phenomena like ‘protest 
bidders’, ‘warm glow’, ‘cold prickle’, and ‘altruism’ (Andreoni, 1990).  
 
Evolutionary policy vs. public choice theory 
Public choice theory transfers the utilitarian axioms of the rational, maximising agent of the 
neoclassical economic model to political science. Yet public choice theory is less-interventionist 
than neoclassical economic policy theory. Cost-benefit analysis or public policies to correct 
market failures assume benign decision-makers acting to maximize social welfare. As opposed 
to such a normative approach, public choice theory offers a positive, descriptive (and thus 
complementary) approach, which depicts policy-makers as being selfish like other rational 
economic agents (Witt, 1992; O’Neill, 1998). In addition, it identifies multiple stakeholders, 
bureaucrats, voters, politicians and interest groups, which rationally assess the costs and benefits 
of alternative actions and seek rents from policy change (Buchanan et al., 1980). Policies, even 
sub-optimal ones, do not change as long as potential benefits of change are outweighed by costs. 
Public choice theory seeks to analyze the costs and benefits different instruments imply for 
different actors and predict outcomes on the basis of the power that particular actors have, and 
how this power is wielded in the political process (Hahn, 1999). Although transaction and 
information costs are recognized as sources of sub-optimal policy outcomes, public choice 
theory denies state intervention to reduce them, as policy action is likely to be captured by rent 
seeking interests (Buchanan, 1986). Competitive market pressures in the public and economic 
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sphere are expected to increase efficiency. The implication in terms of institutional design is 
then that the role of the State should be constrained to the establishment or redefinition of 
property rights. The privatization of public management and the introduction of competition in 
administration are also advocated.  
The theory of evolutionary policy change shares with public choice theory a concern for 
intentional actors struggling in the policy arena to promote their interests. But they differ in 
important ways. First, the attention given by evolutionary theory to bounded rationality 
contrasts with public choice theory’s assumptions of perfect rationality. Bounded rationality 
produces agenda-setting effects, which highlight the importance of learning and communication 
between actors, factors often underplayed in public choice models (Witt, 2003). Second, given 
bounded rationality and limitations in the capacity to process information, actors often are not 
capable of defining and articulating clearly their interests (Witt, 2003). Evolutionary theory 
recognizes altruistic and other motivations alongside selfishness. Political ideas and discourses 
assume a role beyond representing well-articulated interests; they are the glue that articulates 
such interests. This view allows more optimism for political mediation, compromises and 
collaboration, than the zero-sum competitive view of public choice. It fits well with insights 
from the adaptive management literature (discussed below), concerning the critical role of 
information brokers, learning or communication agents and boundary organizations that bring 
together disparate sources of information and help create new discourses around conflicting 
problems that can produce new, previously unforeseen, political alliances and solutions 
(Feldman et al., 2006).  Third, path dependency provides a plausible counter to the functionalist 
mode of explanation that underlies public choice theory, under which existing political 
arrangements are the equilibrium outcome of the rational choices of individual actors. 
Increasing returns create causality in contingent historical events: present institutions are not 
inevitable or necessarily superior in some functional sense (Pierson, 2000b; Kerr, 2002). Power 
asymmetries and learning effects may have entrained policy evolution in undesirable paths.  
Some evolutionary theorists share the Hayekian anti-interventionist view, according to 
which, policy arrangements and institutional norms have evolved over time through complex 
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processes, that no central coordinating agency, given its limitations in information processing, 
should ever try to change (Hayek, 1967; Pelikan and Wegner, 2003). Public choice theory added 
more fuel to Hayekian arguments by breaking down the State to particular rent-seeking interests 
ready to direct and capture the benefits of new policies to their advantage. Hayek´s and 
Buchanan’s theories underpinned 1980s political programs that sought to reduce State 
interventionism and privatize its competencies. Yet many evolutionary theories recognize that 
the State agencies are not just an average stakeholder or agent and that they are perhaps more 
rational and less self-interested than the average economic agent. Furthermore, power 
asymmetries and other sources of increasing returns and lock-in call for decisive, structural 
interventions to change the selection environment that only public administrations are capable 
of.  
This is somewhat at odds with the recognition that, because of political path dependence, 
the capacity to change public policy is much more limited than conventionally thought (Pierson, 
2000b). There is in general a tension between understandings of evolution at a higher level as a 
complex product of the struggle between different interests, and evolutionary policy design 
recommendations that assume benign policy-makers with the capacity to design and control the 
policy system. One way out of this tension is to see evolutionary policy as being about 
designing institutional procedures (rather than choosing instruments), which provide incentives 
for experimentation, learning and adaptive policy making (Witt, 2003). The recent literature on 
transition management and policy (Section 5) reflects this insight, and therefore comes up with 
rigorous proposals – convincing or not – to re-conceptualize policy problems and reform policy 
practice. 
A second tension revolves around what Witt (1992, 2003) calls the endogenization of the 
theorist-analyst within evolutionary accounts of policy change. Public choice theory is 
somewhat contradictory since its own recommendations, such as outsourcing and privatization, 
are to be implemented by the bureaucrats and politicians themselves. Bureaucrats are thus seen 
as self-interested except when it comes to applying the policy proposals of public choice theory. 
An evolutionary perspective resolves this tension by perceiving the theorist/analyst as a 
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participant in the policy process, who generates information and seeks to attract attention (Witt, 
2003), i.e. a partisan in the struggle of ideas for survival. A political process that facilitates a 
plurality of contributions enhances scientific contestability and is more likely to lead to better 
outcomes (Witt, 2003; Norgaard, 1994). In this sense, policy design recommendations from an 
evolutionary perspective are not infallible, but rather tentative ideas to experiment with.    
 
Evolutionary policy vs. resilience and adaptive management 
Resilience has two alternative interpretations: (i) the time necessary for a disturbed system to 
return to its original state (Pimm, 1984); and (ii) the amount of disturbance that a system can 
absorb before moving to another state (Holling, 1973, 1986). The concept was first born in 
ecology: the dynamics of ecosystems and natural resources involves reversible as well as 
irreversible dynamics. The reversible dynamics relate to population growth and ecosystem 
succession, while the irreversible changes are partly the result of evolutionary changes, in the 
short run especially covering selection processes. Irreversibility further involves systems being 
able to move to alternate equilibria. Some authors have proposed analogies of resilience in 
socio-economic systems, dealing with the impact of bureaucracy on resilience, the comparison 
of social and market economy systems, the shortcomings of policies aimed at tight control and 
optimal trajectories rather than experiments, diversity, flexibility and adaptability (see Levin et 
al., 1998; Gunderson and Holling, 2002) and the capacity of businesses to renew strategies 
ahead of turbulent times (Hamel and Valinkangas, 2003). Resilience may be a useful basis for a 
policy theory if certain conditions are satisfied (Walker et al., 2002): systems are not convex, 
i.e. they contain thresholds, exhibit hysteresis and show irreversible change. Whereas within 
traditional economics this has been approached with nonlinear models providing aggregate 
descriptions of systems, evolutionary approaches might shed light on the underlying microlevel 
mechanisms involved. 
 The capacity of a system to adapt is an important component of resilience. Adaptive 
management refers to policies which are run like hypotheses and experiments, continuously 
monitored, updated and adjusted. Adaptive policies are not designed to control a system but to 
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provide opportunities for learning in order to accommodate changing circumstances (Walters, 
1986; Folke et al., 2005). Collaboration between scientists from different disciplines, policy-
makers and stakeholders is a hallmark of adaptive management (Poff et al., 2003; Folke et al., 
2005). Adaptive institutional forms include polycentric institutional arrangements bringing 
together agencies with different sectoral competencies often operating at different 
administrative or geographical levels (McGinnis, 2000), informal networks between actors at 
different levels of decisions and new, so-called flexible or boundary organizations that span 
existing competencies (Westley, 1995; Feldman et al., 2006). These rather generic principles 
have been influential in actual ecosystem management policies and programs (Poff et al., 2003; 
Kallis et al., 2009; Stankey et al., 2003; Lee, 2000). 
 Evolutionary and resilience/adaptation policy theory are complementary, rather than 
antagonistic models. They share an emphasis on uncertainty and surprise, diversity as capacity 
to adapt, and experimentation and learning. This is no surprise since their intellectual roots, 
evolutionary theory on the one hand, and ecology and self-organization (complex adaptive 
systems) theory on the other, are interlinked. But there are also some important differences. 
First, whereas resilience focuses on interaction between system components where it recognizes 
complementary diversity of functional groups of species (Walker et al., 2006), evolution is more 
concerned with diversity within populations giving rise to competition and selection. In 
addition, resilience theory notes that resilience is higher the larger is “response diversity” (or 
“functional redundancy”), which denotes the range of responses to disturbance within species or 
agents belonging to the same functional group, i.e. contributing to the same function in the 
system. Attention for both functional and response diversity provides a possible connection with 
evolutionary theory that deserves elaboration, notably in the context of social-economic 
applications of resilience. Like the evolutionary theory of the policy process, adaptive 
management sees the scientist/analyst as part of the policy process. It puts, however, more 
emphasis on her role in monitoring and evaluating experiments, than in the generation and 
selection of new ideas, highlighted by evolutionary accounts (Witt, 2003).  
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Resilience policy theory focuses on the capacity of systems to adapt during periods of 
turbulence and the attributes that will help them to do so. But it does not have a theory about the 
factors that might inhibit the evolution of adaptive organizations/institutions. Historical path-
dependency, increasing returns of past policies or technologies and spatial lock-in may help 
explain why it is so hard for adaptive organizations to succeed and diffuse. Resilience theory 
and adaptive management are also somewhat oblivious of the broader political, economic or 
technological context within which adaptive organizations or institutions come to operate. 
Evolutionary emphasis on the selection environment (regulatory, market), and the need for 
policies to influence it, is a useful complement and goes well with the observation of empirical 
studies of adaptive management experiments, concerning the importance of supportive political 
institutions and regulations (Kallis et al., 2009). The evolutionary idea also of creating protected 
niches for new (policy or technological) experiments is also distinctive from resilience 
approaches.  
Like in recent writings on transition management (Section 5), resilience theory 
recognizes that certain systems function at multiple scales characterized by critical multilevel or 
cross-scale effects (Gunderson and Holling, 2002). This is referred to as “panarchy”, to reflect 
nested adaptive cycles across space and time scales, some slow and some fast. The term 
“hierarchy” was regarded as being too much associated with a rigid and top-down structure.  
Panarchy-resilience theory can be compared with multilevel evolutionary theory which 
combines individual and group selection, recognizing that individuals join to form groups, and 
that groups influence individual behavior (e.g., through cultural transmission, norms, constraints 
and hierarchies). 
 Table 2 summarizes the main differences between the four policy perspectives. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
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8. Conclusion 
We have explored the idea of how public policy is shaped if one adopts the perspective of 
evolutionary thinking. For this reason we have first given a brief overview of (mainly non-
genetic) evolutionary thinking. It involves a framework developed around the notions of 
diversity, population, selection, inheritance, innovation, coevolution, group selection, path-
dependence and lock-in. In particular, we stressed that diversity is a multidimensional concept. 
We discussed the complex and often misunderstood relationship between evolution and 
progress. Here ‘what is’ is often confused with ‘what ought to be’. The long standing debate on 
evolutionary progress suggests that evolution has some elements of directionality and progress, 
but certainly is not identical with continuous progress. There are many reasons for the latter. 
Selection is a local search process which gives rise to a local optimum, adaptations are often 
compromises between different objectives, historical constraints limit the range of evolutionary 
change, and coevolution means that the environment is dynamic so that the notion of 
optimization even starts to drift. 
To illustrate the relevance of evolutionary thinking for policy, we considered 
evolutionary policies at two levels: institutional, i.e. policy change itself, and policy design. 
Central at the first level is the idea that political and economic environments impose selective 
pressures upon alternative political strategies and that political actors adapt their strategies to 
this selection environment which is multi-dimensional (media, elections, public opinion, power 
and lobbying). Moreover, since this environment is changing and evolutionary as well, it is best 
described by a process of coevolution. In addition, historical constraints or path-dependencies 
are relevant, leading to the notion of “policy paradigm”, which reflects that earlier, historical 
events greatly influence and hamper political and institutional developments at a later stage. 
We examined evolutionary policy design in three areas, namely technical change, 
sustainability transitions, and regulation of consumers. The first of these is most developed, as 
in fact much of the innovation studies literature implicitly or explicitly adopts an evolutionary 
angle of thought. Insights focus on innovation policies, diversity management, exploiting status 
seeking behaviour of consumers to stimulate escape from lock-in, etc.  
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We recognized that there are tensions between the two levels of analysis, i.e. 
understanding the policy process as an evolutionary process itself, where policymakers or 
scientists are mere actors in the struggle for policy selection, and evolutionary policy-design, 
which assumes a more top-down design and control of policies. An understanding of 
evolutionary policy as being primarily about the design of institutional procedures that enable 
learning and experimentation and a recognition of policy proposals – including evolutionary 
ones – as tentative contributions to the struggle of ideas, somewhat relieve these tensions.  
Next, we identified the problem that current evolutionary approaches lack a consistent 
and systematic elaboration of policy, and in particular do not employ clear criteria and goals. 
For this reason, we suggest a number of possible approaches in this respect, among others, using 
the same criteria as in neoclassical economics, or focus on effectiveness of policy given the 
complexity, uncertainty and limited control of evolutionary systems, and questioning the notion 
of a fixed social welfare function in view of bounded rationality (individual inefficiency) and 
evolving preferences. Finally, we compared evolutionary theory with three other, influential 
approaches to policy analysis. These are the neoclassical-economic theory of externality 
regulation, public choice theory, and adaptive management and resilience. Evolutionary policy 
turns out to be the closest in spirit to the latter, and the most distant to the first of these 
approaches.  
Whatever one may think of the relevance of the notion of evolutionary policy, we 
hopefully have made convincing that evolutionary thinking offers a distinct perspective on 
public policy design and change. 
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Table 1. Components of evolution and their consequences 
Components of evolution Consequences 
Population Population growth, cyclic patterns, splitting (group 
selection), extinction, gradual change 
Bounded rationality (routines, habits, imitation, 
myopia, learning, status seeking) 
Sluggishness, socially undesirable lock-in, herd 
behaviour, distinction (status) 
Diversity (variety, balance and disparity) Options for future development, potential for 
recombination, defines range for selection and 
fitness improvement 
Selection (market, R&D, institutions, regulation, 
physical-geographical-climate) 
Adaptation 
Repeated selection in the presence of increasing 
returns to scale (positive feedback) can give rise to 
path-dependence and lock-in (historical 
constraints) 
Innovation (mutation, recombination, serendipity, 
modularity) 
Emergence of new levels (nested or 
hyperstructures), unlocking 
Inheritance (reproduction, imitation) Stability, accumulation of adaptations, historical 
constraints (path dependency) 
Isolation (geographical, institutional) Radical innovation, unlocking (‘speciation’) 
Coevolution  Complexity, sensitivity, less predictability, 
positive feedback (red queen effects, arms race), 
Conflict/antagonism evolving into 
mutualism/cooperation 
Group selection Parochialism, emergence of (group) norms and 
institutions, group conflict (war), multilevel 
evolution, power and hierarchy 
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Table 2. A comparison of evolutionary with other policy relevant theories 
 
 Neoclassical 
Economics 
Public Choice 
Theory 
Resilience 
Theory 
Evolutionary  
theory 
Agents and 
behaviour 
Representative agent 
Rational – utility or 
profit maximising 
 
Multiple stakeholders 
Rational choice 
Rent-seeking 
System of 
complementary agents 
Experimenting, 
learning 
Population of diverse 
and interacting agents 
Bounded rationality 
Searching, learning 
Policy criteria / goals Optimal allocation 
Efficiency 
Cost-effectiveness 
Efficiency 
Individual freedom of 
choice 
Resilience or extended 
stability 
Maximum scale 
Agnostic, or 
Diversity  
Evolutionary potential 
Precautionary principle 
Emphasis in policy 
instruments 
Price instruments such 
as taxes and tradable 
permits 
Property rights Adaptive management 
including experiments 
Maintaining  diversity 
for flexible response 
Information diffusion 
Maintaining or 
stimulating diversity 
Real-world policy 
proposals 
Full cost pricing 
Cost-benefit evaluation 
of policies 
Taxing externalities 
Privatization 
Identify stakeholder 
conflicts 
Control rent-seeking 
Poly-centric, 
collaborative 
institutions and 
programs 
 
Protected niches for 
new technologies or 
institutions 
Avoiding or escaping 
dominance of one 
technology (lock-in) 
Policy Analyst External to policy External to policy Performs experiments, 
monitors, evaluates and 
learns 
Generator of 
ideas/diversity 
Participant in struggle 
of policy ideas 
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